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When the folks at USDA first asked  me to serve as a panelist today and talk to you about 
Asia markets, I felt both flattered and somewhat intimidated, assuming most people in 
this audience probably enjoy more Asia experience than I have, but I was able to draw 
from our Sunkist marketing people who have extensive experience operating in those 
markets to help me prepare  my remarks. So today, I hope you find your time well spent.  
 
I’d like to first make some general observations about Asian markets, some common 
issues in the trade , and then talk about individual country markets. 
   
While there has been a great deal of talk and media coverage about the “Asian Economic 
Crisis,” in fact, the American citrus industry has been much more severely damaged to 
date by the winter storms of El Nino than anything dished out to us by Asian economic 
disruptions.  That is not to say we have been unaffected by the recent economic turn of 
events in S.E. Asia, but I think we need to keep it in perspective and not be overwhelmed 
by it. 
 
Some Background … 
   
With the economic boom occurring in Asia over the past decade or more, American 
agricultural trade substantially gravitated and increased to that part of the world.  
 
The Southeast Asian economies - Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and South 
Korea - have in recent times consumed 12 % of American agricultural exports.  With  
their currencies recently  devaluated anywhere from 40 to 80 %, the impact on this 
consumption is already in evidence and could  become more pronounced.  Particularly as needed belt tightening and financial reforms are seriously implemented by the respective 
governments in response to the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the world’s major financial institutions. U.S. agricultural exports to these affected  
countries is projected by USDA economists to decline $500 million in 1998.     
 
The response of these governments.  as you probably have read, varies greatly - Korea 
seems intent upon undetaking actions that will lead to a quick and strong recovery; 
Malaysia appears to be taking appropriate action but Indonesia under President Suharto 
seems still resistant to real reform necessary.  Thailand is somewhere in between but 
heading in the right direction.  
 
What is likely to happen in the coming months?  Expert opinion ranges from “we’ve 
already seen the worst of it”   to “the effect will be minimal on the U.S.” to much more 
dramatically negative “crisis” descriptions.      
 
Markets like Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia are new and developing markets for us, along 
with Vietnam. The economic crunch has impacted our sales in these areas.  Before the 
recent events, Malaysia was our fastest growing market in the world; Indonesia was 
increasing the size and frequency of its orders in our first year in that market; Thailand 
was becoming a steady customer. Even Vietnam was promising with some small orders. 
While some of these markets, might recover fairly quickly - within the next 12 to 18 
months, some may take longer depending upon how serious they are in implementing 
fiscal reforms. 
 
To date, the $34 billion financial assistance package from the IMF and such measures as 
USDA’s $2 billion export credit guarantee/ GSM program have, in the short term, helped 
mitigate the effect of this downturn on American agricultural imports. However, if the 
economic problem continues longer term (meaning two years plus) USDA predicts a 
decline of American agricultural exports worldwide by 3 to 6 %.  The combination of 
currency devaluation against the dollar and reduced consumer demand could significantly 
impact agricultural exports to the region.   
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Given the financial and economic interdependence of the region, the problems of the 
Tigers of Southeast Asia will perhaps have some negative impact on Japan, where 
economic conditions are fairly stable and possibly will be even further strengthened by 
the new banking reforms and stabilization package just approved by the Japanese Diet. 
($238 billion)  Additionally, the Japanese government is likely to embark upon an effort 
to stimulate the economy later this year.  However, USDA projects American agricultural 
exports to Japan could decline by as much as 2 % ($200 million) in 1998 and prices are 
likely to be lower given the reduced demand and generally lower prices throughout Asia.  
 
Decline in value of domestic currencies against the U.S. dollar make our products more 
expensive for those Asian consumers creating an opportunity for similar but cheaper 
products from lower production cost competitors - notably Southern Hemisphere 
producers - seeking to displace us in those markets.   We need to think of market position 
not in the short term which can be addressed to some extent by IMF and USDA’s GSM 
help but for the longer term. The growth rate and developmental momentum in that part 
of the world is too great to give up on too quickly.  The Pacific Rim - despite the current 
( and we believe temporary) economic woes - continues to offer great long term markets 
of opportunity.  
 
But this story is just playing out… our perceptions about the matter are mostly anecdotal 
- with some industries seeing decline in individual orders from different Asian markets. 
We have been through these economic downturns previously and some experts seem to 
think it could take up to two (2) years for these economies to recover, but recover they 
will. Our thinking and strategy, while mindful of short term needs,  therefore must be 
designed for the longer haul. For American agricultural exporters like Sunkist, who have 
for a long time been nurturing and developing those markets, we have too much invested 
and have too much confidence in those countries to prompt redirection of our attention 
elsewhere.  The market growth   potential is too great to be denied over time.  
 
  3As I’ve said, from Sunkist perspective, at least based upon the last few months, we have 
been hurt much more by El Nino storms in California and Arizona than by Asian 
economic problems. Except for some decline in small, fledgling markets like Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, our sales in  Asia have been pretty much on track.  In fact, we 
have more orders coming out of Asia than fruit to fill them because of El Nino. USDA 
reports high value horticultural product sales actually increased the last quarter of ’97 in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan.  We’ve not experienced decline in our Korean market where our 
sales continue on track with a slight increase.    
 
If  - acting through and with the cooperation of our government -  we could affect 
favorable improvements in those countries import policies, namely reducing the existing 
tariff rates, the currency devaluations could to some degree be mitigated in terms of 
competitive pricing palatable to those hard pressed consumers. For example, if we were 
to enjoy a 5 % instead of a 50 % or 89 % tariff in Korea on our oranges; a 5 % instead of 
a 51 % duty in Thailand on our fresh citrus fruit; a 5 % instead of 38 % on our navel 
oranges in Japan,; a 5% instead of a 40% tariff on oranges in Taiwan - we could better 
price our fruit for those consumers and still make the needed margin for the transaction to 
be worthwhile. 
That’s why Secretary Glickman’s opening remarks today is music to our ears -  we very 
much appreciate his focus on those tariff rates. 
 
We have experienced growing use of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and claims 
as the new  and preferred tools of protectionism by those interested in creating obstacles 
to trade.   
   the use of inordinately low and scientifically unjustified maximum pesticide residue 
tolerances used to obstruct citrus fruit shipments into Korea from California… 
describe how our government aggressively intervened and now problem being 
solved… 
   the use of expansive quarantine standards by Australia and New Zealand and 
periodically flirted with by Korea to restrict the fruit eligible for export from the U.S. 
to their markets… 
  4   ongoing efforts by trading partners to impose new and  onerous requirements for 
attestation on government phytosanitary certifications which must accompany fresh 
fruit shipments from the U.S., eg. re. types, volumes, dates of application and 
identification of specific groves, for pesticide use; additional labeling requirements, 
etc. 
 
To address these matters with our Asian trading partners, we have urged our government 
to go back to the SPS Agreement of the Uruguay Round. Engage in aggressive 
enforcement of its provisions  -- the need for sound science to be the foundation for any 
SPS requirements; greater adherence to internationally accepted standards, norms and 
practices to achieve the stated goal of  harmonization. These are obligations of WTO 
membership which must be constantly emphasized in discussions with our trading 
partners. The response received from USTR and USDA has been very positive as 
exemplified by Deputy Under Secretary Gus Schumacher’s comments at today’s opening 
session.  
 
We need to further strengthen international standards set forth by Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the IPPC and IOE.  It is far easier to get our trading partners to comply with 
policies that are identified and recognized as “international standards” than demand their 
compliance with US standards. 
 
In this regard, we would urge the USDA to place greater emphasis on programs aimed at 
sharing scientific research and data upon which our SPS policies are based with our 
trading partners.  It is hoped that thru such information sharing, science based policies of 
SPS regulations, quarantine requirements, food safety, etc.  will gain widespread 
acceptance       
 
Lets take a quick look at some of the key country markets ---   
 
SOUTH KOREA -  
  5   a very important and growing market where we’ve not experienced a decline in sales 
this year; 
   but one not easily developed - requires a great deal of work to overcome some 
institutional problems that dictate against competition - 
 
1.   The Tariff Rate Quota or TRQ - that restricts the volume of imported citrus into 
Korean markets ( This is something Secretary Schumacher mentioned earlier today) - 
last year set at 25,000 MT and increased slightly each year.  However purchases are 
low bid based/.  This precludes advertising and market promotion since we can sell 
only limited volumes and for lowest prices.  You can not generate more sales and 
improve prices by advertising under these conditions.    
2.   Tariff rates on citrus both within and outside the quota are very high - 50% within the 
quota and 89 % outside the quota 
3.   the import program has been turned over to the Cheju citrus growers association to 
administer.  So our Korean competitors control all imports of citrus. 
 
As I earlier noted, we have experienced the use of SPS regulations to restrict the trade.  
However when our government aggressively asserted our rights and their (Korea’s) 
obligations under the SPS agreement and noted Korean policy was at significant variance 
with international standards (Codex) to their credit, Korea responded and moved to bring 
their standards into Codex conformity.  
 
Concerning the economic downturn in Korea, most food industry officials in Korea 
believe the IMF-mandated reforms are necessary to restore fiscal integrity. And we see 
the Korean government implementing action., The expectation is that the recovery will 
be rapid and strong.   
 
It is similarly a strongly held view that the earlier government and media led frugality 
campaign  was a mistake that could actually compound the economic difficulty by 
encouraging people not to spend. That seems to have been laid to rest.  President-elect 
Kim Day Jung said “If a product is good, whether made in Korea or overseas, a desirable 
  6pattern of consumption is good and will make it easier to overcome the recession…” ( 
Asian Wall Street Journal)   
 
The falling won has resulted in 30 to 80 percent increases in imported food prices. Sales 
of some luxury items are off by as much as 30 %.  However large supermarkets and 





It is the view of our fresh fruit export marketing staff that all of the superlatives used to 
describe the potential of gaining access to the consumer market in the PRC are not 
exaggerations. 
 
(Briefly summarize our current situation seeking access) 
 
The steadfast help and determination of our government from the President to USTR - 
USDA - FAS - APHIS  and Governors like California’s Pete Wilson  and Arizona’s Jane 
Hull. 
 
We’ve seen some accommodation for US horticultural products (apples, cherries, grapes) 
in the past year by the Chinese government but typically from limited geographically 
defined areas instead of areas defined by SPS science as compliments the provisions of 
the SPS Agreement for WTO Members. 
While we are yet to gain official approval for selling our fruit in the PRC, we still see our 
fruit entering via Hong Kong brokers…we see our labeled fruit all over China.  
 
Generally, exports to China and Hong Kong are not expected to decline significantly 
unless the Asian economic downturn becomes a protracted recession.  Nevertheless, 
retail fruit prices are down at least 15 to 20 % in key China markets like Guangzhou, 
  7presumably due to reduced marketability in other parts of Asia effected by  economic 
woes.    
 
While historically a problem in China and elsewhere in Asia, trademark and fruit box 
counterfeiting is becoming an increasing problem. With local wholesalers putting 
domestically-grown, lower quality and cheaper fruit into what appear to be imported fruit 
boxes.  This helps them collect a higher price.  We’ve had first hand  experience in this 
with “Sumkits” and “Ruuster” brands.   
Note L.A. Times article re. PRC apples being sold in Taiwan as Washington and 
California fruit, complete with bogus labels.  
 
VIETNAM  - is a very new and developing market for us… as noted the duty on our 
fresh fruit is officially 30 % but the reality of the trade is inevitably different depending 
upon the relationship between the importer and customs inspectors. The infrastructure in 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Min City while lacking by US standards seems to be adequate for 
inbound fruit. Its been a fledgling market that no doubt will, like its neighbor Cambodia 
suffer significant drop in investment due to the Asian economic problems. However, long 
term we see this as a viable market for our fruit.    
  
Singapore 
•  has been a major marketing center for us over the past twenty years but that role will 
likely change as Southeast Asian markets historically served by brokers in Singapore 
become more sophisticated in trade matters; 
•  Indonesia and Malaysia are now able to directly import into their markets; 
•  Singapore will ultimately change from a wholesale to a retail economy. 
   
JAPAN -  
 
•  Sunkist has marketed successfully in Japan for a long time – it is our second largest 
foreign market - in the range of 11 to 14 million cartons of fruit per year. 
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sanitary and phytosanitary issues.  That is not to say we have no disagreements but  
those disagreements we do have are legitimate and science-based.  For example, 
despite our extensive efforts to exclude exotic pests from coming into California, 
casual travelers and more recently commercial contraband fruit importers have 
brought into California fruit infested with pests like Mediterranean fruit fly the 
prompts quarantines in detection areas. 
•  Japan recognizes USDA’s exotic pest quarantine and eradication program and 
continues to accept fruit from pest free areas of production outside the designated 
quarantine zones. 
•  In our view this is the way a quarantine program should work and does work with 
Japan.  While we’ve had periodic incidents of Medfly, our fruit continues to flow to 
Japan without ever transferring a pest into their market.  This is a point we 
continually make with a number of our other Asian trading partners - Korea, China, 
Australia and New Zealand. 
•  Difficulties in the Japanese market do occur - Disinformation Campaign of the Japan 
Offspring Fund re. California lemons, South African grapefruit (2-4D) and TBZ on 
U.S. apples.   
 
•  Our biggest ongoing complaint with Japan is the unconscionably high duties 
confronting our fruit - upwards of 38% for our navel (Winter) oranges and 20% for 
our Valencia (Summer) oranges.  Last year our California and Arizona shippers paid 
nearly $38 million to the Japanese treasury in tariffs. Hopefully, our government will 
in the scheduled 1999 agricultural trade negotiations be able to bring down those 
tariffs.              
 
In fact, in all of the markets throughout Asia, the demand for our products is without 
question but we are held back by government restrictions, including tariff rate quotas and 
unjustifiably high tariffs.  Thailand 51%; Korea 50% and 89%; Taiwan 40%; China 40% 
plus a 17% VAT. 
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Despite what we read in the press and what might be occurring in other sectors of the 
economies of Asia, we view those markets long term and with great optimism 
particularly if our government is able to get those high tariffs reduced or eliminated in the 
next WTO round.  Thank you very much for your time.    
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